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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The State uses two methods to avoid meeting the issues 
presented by this appeal. First, it claims that the Press has 
failed to preserve its claims by failing to raise the issues 
below. Even a cursory review of the transcript and pleadings, 
however, reveals that all issues presented on appeal were raised 
below and considered by the district court. The State's effort 
to avoid the merits on this ground is baseless. Second, rather 
than address the merits of the issues presented by the facts and 
circumstances of the case under review by this Court, the State 
presents new issues for the Court's consideration. The State 
apparently seeks an advisory opinion regarding whether there is a 
"right of access to any documents in a civil or criminal case 
once it is filed in any court," (Resp. Br. at 15, emphasis 
added), or whether "there is a first amendment presumptive right 
of public access extending to pretrial documents filed in 
connection with the criminal warrant or subpoena issuance 
processes." (Resp. Br. at 16.) These issues are not presented 
by the facts and circumstances of the case before the Court and 
are therefore not properly considered at this time. 
The issues before the Court are (1) whether the Press 
has a presumptive right of access, at a post-investigatory phase, 
to documents filed with and/or considered by the court in 
connection with a presumptively open preliminary hearing, and 
(2) whether the Press has a presumptive right of access to 
documents admitted into evidence during an open preliminary 
hearing. On these issues, the State presents little argument or 
authority to contradict the Press's view that a presumptive right 
of access should be found. A presumptive right of access should 
be extended to documents filed with and/or reviewed by a court in 
connection with a preliminary hearing and evidence received 
during the course of a preliminary hearing. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE PRESS HAS A RIGHT OF ACCESS TO PRETRIAL 
DOCUMENTS FILED AND/OR REVIEWED IN CONNECTION 
WITH A PRESUMPTIVELY OPEN PRELIMINARY HEARING 
A. The Press Has A First Amendment Right Of Access To 
Documents Filed And/Or Reviewed In Connection With A 
Preliminary Hearing. 
The State improperly characterizes the issue before 
this Court at various times as whether "the public has a first 
amendment right of access to any document in a civil or criminal 
case once it is filed in any court," (Resp. Br. at 15), or 
whether "there is a first amendment presumptive right of public 
access extending to pretrial documents filed in connection with 
the criminal warrant or subpoena issuance processes." (Resp. Br. 
at 16.) Neither statement of issue is correct. The Press does 
not seek a right of access to any document once it is filed with 
any court, nor does it seek access to documents filed in 
connection with an ongoing criminal investigation. Rather, the 
issue before the Court is whether the Press has a presumptive 
right of access, at a post-investigatory phase, to documents 
filed with and/or considered by the court in connection with a 
presumptively open preliminary hearing. 
The defendants in this case were arrested and charged 
on November 25, 1988, and were, from that point forward, 
incarcerated. (R. 290; Transcript of Hearing, September 11, 
1989, at 148.) At that point in time, the investigation with 
respect to these defendants had concluded.1 At that point in 
time, the probable cause statements, affidavits in support of 
search warrants and subpoenas for witnesses which were then in 
the court file were no longer considered by the magistrate as 
part of the investigatory process but, rather, were reviewed by 
the magistrate as part of the bindover determination. It is the 
court's review of court-filed documents in connection with a 
presumptively open preliminary hearing that is the subject of 
this appeal. 
Much of the caselaw and analysis offered by the State 
at pages 15 to 36 of its responsive brief focus on whether there 
is a presumptive right of access to warrant materials, including 
search warrants and supporting affidavits, during an ongoing 
criminal investigation. In Times-Mirror Co. v. United States. 
873 F.2d 1210 (9th Cir. 1989), for example, the court considered 
whether the public had a qualified right of access to search 
warrants and supporting affidavits relating to an investigation 
which was ongoing and before any indictments had been returned. 
873 F.2d at 1211. The court held that there is no presumption of 
access to such documents while a pre-indictment investigation is 
ongoing. .Id. at 1216. This holding, however, was carefully 
limited to ongoing investigations. The court said: "We need not 
and do not decide at this time the question whether the public 
1
 Arguably, the State continued in its "investigation" past the point of incarceration as it deemed 
necessary to solidify its case against these defendants. Clearly, however, the phase of the investigation 
which may demand heightened sensitivity to protect legitimate police concerns, i.e., flight of suspects 
and/or destruction of evidence, is substantially diminished if not eliminated at the point of arrest and 
incarceration. Once the defendants are incarcerated and informed of the charges pending against them, 
the public is entitled to a presumptive right of access to documents filed with the court and reviewed by 
that court in connection with the bindover phase of the proceeding -- a phase that is presumptively open 
as a matter of Utah and federal constitutional law. From that point forward, the State should be required 
to meet the burden of demonstrating why the documents should remain under seal. 
has a First Amendment right of access to warrant materials after 
an investigation is concluded or after indictments have been 
returned." .Id. at 1218. 
The other principal case relied on by the State, 
Baltimore Sun Co. v. Goetz, 886 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1989), 
similarly limited its inquiry to the interval between execution 
of the warrants and indictment. 886 F.2d at 62. The Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals held there was no qualified right of 
access to these documents at the pre-indictment stage. Once the 
indictments were returned, however, the court unsealed the 
documents. 886 F.2d at 63. 
These cases are not relevant to the issue presented by 
the facts of this case. As noted above, the investigatory phase 
of the criminal proceeding with respect to these defendants had 
concluded. At the time the Press first sought access to these 
documents, the defendants were incarcerated and had been for over 
three weeks. The interest the State may have had in maintaining 
the secrecy of these documents (e.g., to reduce the risks that 
suspects or arrest warrant subjects would flee or destroy 
evidence) had long since passed. At the post-investigation 
phase, the documents previously filed become relevant only to the 
pending bindover proceeding, a proceeding which itself is 
presumptively open. "There is no reason to distinguish between 
pretrial proceedings and the documents filed in regard to them." 
Associated Press v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 705 F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 
1983) (invalidating post-indictment order sealing all documents 
filed with the court). 
The State also offers numerous citations to Utah 
statutes to support the other issue it contends is before this 
Court, whether "the public has a first amendment right of access 
to any document in a civil or criminal case once it is filed in 
any court." (Resp. Br. at 15.) The State argues that there "is 
no history of unrestricted public access to all court-filed 
documents in Utah" (Resp. Br. at 23), and urges this as a basis 
for denying the relief sought by the Press. Again, however, the 
State misunderstands the issue that is presented by the facts to 
this Court. The Press does not seek access to "any document 
filed in any court." Rather, the Press seeks access to documents 
filed with and/or considered by the court in connection with a 
presumptively open preliminary hearing proceeding. The "parade 
of horribles" set forth at pages 21 to 24 and 32 to 35 of the 
State's brief is simply irrelevant to the issue presented. 
In short, none of the authorities or arguments offered 
by the State is relevant to the issue presented by the facts of 
this case: whether there is a presumptive right of access to 
documents filed with and/or considered by the court in connection 
with presumptively open pretrial criminal proceedings. On this 
issue, the parties appear to be in agreement. Indeed, the State 
itself notes that "creating a citizenry that is informed about 
its judicial process and the workings of its criminal justice 
system . . . can be and risl achieved through public access to 
presumptively open pretrial criminal proceedings and the 
documents filed in conjunction with them," (Resp. Br. at 30, 
empha sis added.)2 
B. The Utah Constitution Guarantees The Press A Right Of 
Access To Documents Filed And/Or Reviewed In Connection With 
Preliminary Hearings. 
1. The Press has preserved its claim of access under 
the Utah Constitution. 
The State's principal argument under the Utah 
Constitution is that the Press has failed to preserve this 
constitutional claim for appeal. (Resp. Br. at 36-37.) This 
claim is simply erroneous. 
In memoranda filed with the district court, the Press 
expressly raised the issue of whether there is a constitutional 
right of access under the Utah Constitution to documents filed 
with or reviewed by the court in connection with a preliminary 
hearing. (R. 596-97.) Following a day long evidentiary hearing 
on September 7, 1989, the court heard oral argument on 
September 11, 1989. This majority of time at this hearing, which 
also lasted a full day, was spent addressing whether to release 
the transcript and documents received in evidence at the 
2
 Although no courts have addressed specifically documents reviewed in conjunction with preliminary 
hearings, numerous courts have held that if the press has the right to attend a particular proceeding, it 
thereby acquires the conditional right to inspect documents filed in connection with the hearing. See, e.g.. 
Washington Post v. Robinson. 935 F.2d 282, 287-88 (D.C Cir. 1991); United States v. Gerena, 869 F.2d 
82, 85 (2d Cir. 1989); Seattle Times Co. v. U. S. Dist. Ct.. 845 F.2d 1513,1516-17 (9th Or. 1988); United 
States v. Haller. 837 F.2d 84, 86-87 (2d Cir. 1988); In re New York Times Co.. 828 F.2d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 
1987); In re Washington Post Co.. 807 F.2d 383, 389-90 (4th Cir. 1986); CBS. Inc. v. U.S. Dist Ct., 765 
R2d 823, 825 (9th Or. 1985); Associated Press v. U.S. Dist Ct.. 705 F.2d 1143,1145 (9th Cir. 1983); 
United States v. Criden. 675 F.2d 550 (3rd Cir. 1982). The State does not dispute the holdings or 
application of these cases (see Resp. Br. at 24-25). It does address in some detail, however, cases holding 
there is a right of access to documents filed in connection with an ongoing investigation, e&, State v. 
Tallman. 537 A.2d 422 (Vt 1987) (Resp. Br. at 25), In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area Outside 
Office of Thomas Gunn. 855 F.2d 569 (8th Cir. 1988) ("Gunn") (Resp. Br. at 26-30), and argues that these 
cases should not be used as a starting point for holding that there is a presumptive access to documents 
filed in connection with an ongoing investigation. As already noted, this case does not present the issue of 
access to documents during the investigatory phase. Rather, the Tallman and Gunn cases are useful only 
by analogy as an indication of the breadth of access rights being granted in courts across the country. 
preliminary hearing. At the end of the day, the parties and the 
court noted that the final issue of access to the court-filed 
documents had not been addressed. Given the late hour at that 
time, the parties submitted that issue on the briefs. 
(Transcript of Hearing, September 11, 1989, at 157-59.) 
Thereafter, when the Press submitted its proposed findings and 
conclusions, it proposed a conclusion that "[t]he Press and 
public have a right under ... the Utah Constitution ... of access 
to ... court files." (R. 627.) Although the court did not adopt 
the Press's proposed conclusion, it was, nonetheless, before the 
court. 
This Court has held that a right of review on appeal is 
preserved if there is some basis in the pleadings and the 
proceedings for assertion of the right. Hollev Milling Co. v. 
Salt Lake & Jordan Mill & Elevator Co., 58 Utah 149, 197 P. 731, 
736 (1921). The Press's claim for a right of access under the 
Utah Constitution was presented both in the pleadings and in the 
proceedings before the district court. The issue is preserved 
and properly considered on review by this Court. 
2. Presumptive access should apply to documents filed 
and/or reviewed in connection with a presumptively 
open preliminary hearing proceeding. 
As set forth in our opening memorandum, in determining 
whether the Utah Constitution requires access to the pretrial 
documents filed in connection with the preliminary hearing in 
this case, this Court should consider whether the documents are 
crucial to preserving an informed involvement in the operations 
of government. See Kearns-Tribune v. Lewis, 685 P.2d 515, 518-22 
(Utah 1984) (Court considered whether access was necessary for 
7 
the public to participate in the democratic process and the 
effect closure would have on this process; Society of 
Professional Journalists v. Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166, 1177 (Utah 
1987) (Court looked to the "nature and purpose" of information or 
proceeding in issue); See Appellant's Br. at 27. 
The State appears to concede that this test is the 
appropriate standard by which to measure the scope of the Utah 
Constitution's guarantee of freedom of the press at it relates to 
documents filed in connection with a preliminary hearing. (Resp. 
Br. at 37.) The State's only argument is that this test is not 
an appropriate standard by which to measure this guarantee as it 
relates to "all pretrial court-filed documents," that is, all 
documents of any kind "filed in any Utah court." (Resp. Br. at 
37.) As previously noted, however, the Press does not seek an 
advisory opinion as to "all pretrial court-filed documents," but 
only as to those documents reviewed in connection with pretrial 
preliminary hearings in criminal matters. The State apparently 
concedes that, as to that issue, the articulated standard is 
appropriate and should govern access in such situations. 
C. The Press Has A Common Law Right Of Access To Documents 
Filed And/Or Reviewed In Connection With Preliminary 
Hearings. 
1. The State misunderstands the common law right and 
its application in Utah. 
The State argues that the federal court cases cited by 
the Press in support of a common law right of access to documents 
should not be considered because these "federal cases recognizing 
a federal common law right of access" provide no precedential 
authority for a conclusion that there is such a common law right 
in Utah. (Resp. Br. at 38.) Of course, there is no federal 
general common law. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
The law applied by the federal courts when reviewing the question 
of access to documents is the law of the state in which it sits 
or, if there is no authority in that state, the general common 
law in other states. Fair v. United States, 234 F.2d 888 (5th 
Cir. 1956). Nonetheless, the numerous federal cases and cases 
from other state courts that have discussed the issue presently 
pending before this Court are instructive and should be 
considered.3 
The State also argues that the common law right of 
access is or was severely limited in scope to give access only to 
those persons with a direct interest in the action. (Resp. Br. 
at 39.) It cites for this proposition an Oregon Supreme Court 
case from 1926, with several other supporting citations. These 
3
 The leading federal case on the issue of access to documents is Nixon v. Warner Communications. 
Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978). In Nixon, the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether 
there exists a common law right to inspect and copy judicial records and documents, including exhibits. 
The case was on appeal from the District of Columbia, which derives its common law from Maryland. See 
In re Parnell's Estate. 275 F. Supp. 609 (D.D.G 1967). To answer the question presented, the Court 
surveyed decisions of nthe courts of this country." 435 U.S. at 597. Of the 26 cases cited, 20 are state 
cases; two are from the District of Columbia; one is a U.S. Supreme Court case; and three others are 
federal cases. See id- at 597-99 nn.7-9. 
Of the federal cases, McCoy v. Providence Journal Co.. 190 F.2d 760, 765-66 (1st Cir. 1951), is 
illustrative of the point In McCoy, a newspaper sought access to public records under both constitutional 
and common law theories. The court asserted federal question jurisdiction based on a federal civil rights 
statute and arising from the newspaper's Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claims. In deciding the 
common law issue, however, the court applied Rhode Island common law and surveyed the status of the 
common law in other states before granting the newspaper the right to inspect and publish the records. 
Nixon is the leading federal case on the issue and federal courts faced with common law claims look 
to Nixon for its precedential value. This does not change the roots of the law, however. It is a misnomer 
to call the common law right of access a "federal common law right," as the State does throughout its brief. 
It is also a mistake to discount federal cases that have discussed the right The number of cases and their 
factual similarities to the present case argue in favor of looking to the federal cases for reasoned policy 
considerations. A multitude of state cases have also recognized and discussed the common law right of 
access, including the cases cited by the Press in its opening briet While it is certainly true that neither 
state cases from other jurisdictions nor federal cases can control the decisions of this Court, they do, 
however, indicate the general consensus among the states and lend reasoned support for a correct decision 
in this case of first impression. 
9 
sources, however, do not accurately depict the scope of the 
common law right. 
The limited common law right advanced by the State 
applied only to an individual citizen seeking access to records 
for private purposes. See Clement v. Graham, 78 Vt. 290, 319-20 
(1906). It did not restrict the broader right of the general 
public to inspect public records as a function of being citizens 
interested in public affairs. One court noted: 
There is no question as to the common-law 
right of the people at large to inspect public 
documents and records. The right is based on 
the interest which citizens have in the matter 
to which the record relates. 
« . . . 
. . . It is absurd to hold that a man 
could inspect the public records, providing 
his purpose was to use the information in some 
litigation, and to deny him the right to 
inspect for some other purposes that might be 
equally beneficial to him. It does not 
protect all of his substantial rights and has 
not been received with general favor in this 
country. 
Nowack v. Fuller, 219 N.W. 749, 750-51 (Mich. 1928)/ 
The vast majority of courts that have considered the 
question have recognized a broader common law right of the 
general public to access public records. E.g., C^JLL—S^./ 320 
A.2d 717, 723 (Del. 1974); United States v. Burka, 289 A.2d 376, 
378-79 (D.C. App. 1972); People ex rel. Gibson v. Peller, 181 
4
 Nowack explains that courts distinguished between a narrow private right and a broader public right 
for procedural purposes, and not for the purpose of restricting access: 
By [enunciating the narrow standard] courts did not mean that [a claimant] 
had no right to inspect the books unless he wanted to use them as evidence, 
but they meant that they would not issue the extraordinary writ of 
mandamus to enforce a private right of inspection, unless the purpose was 
to use it in some pending or prospective suit The rule adopted amounts to 
a restriction on the citizen's remedy rather than on his rights. 
Id. at 751. 
1 n 
N.E.2d 376, 378 (111. App. 1962); State ex rel. Youmans v. Owens, 
137 N.W.2d 470 (Wis. 1965); Nowack v. Fuller, 219 N.W. 749, 750-
51 (Mich. 1928); Eaan v. Board of Water SUPPIV, 98 N.E. 467, 469 
(N.Y. 1912); Ex parte Drawfrauarh, 2 App.D.C. 404, 407-08 (1894); 
Burton v. Tuite, 44 N.W. 282, 285 (Mich. 1889). Indeed, the 
Nixon Court noted in its survey of cases that 
[i]n contrast to the English practice, 
American decisions generally do not condition 
enforcement of this right on a proprietary 
interest in the document or upon a need for it 
as evidence in a lawsuit. The interest 
necessary to support the issuance of a writ 
compelling access has been found, for example, 
in the citizen's desire to keep a watchful eye 
on the workings of public agencies, and in a 
newspaper publisher's intention to publish 
information concerning the operation of 
government. 
Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597-98 (citations omitted).5 
5
 With these principles clear, the cases cited by the State can be understood in their proper context. 
Bend Publishing Co. v. Haner, 244 P. 868 (Ore. 1926), enunciated the narrow right in dictum-without 
exploring its parameters and ramifications-before deciding the case on statutory grounds. The Oregon 
court's cursory review of the common law thus missed the distinction generally agreed upon in the courts. 
Mulford v. Davev, 186 P.2d 360 (Nev. 1947), repeated the narrow right in dictum, citing State v. Grimes, 
84 P. 1061 (Nev. 1906), for support. Grimes, however, recognized the distinction discussed above, 
distinguishing records of general public interest (in which all have a right of access), from one man's 
interest in records relating to another's property (in which the private party must show an interest). 
Burton v. Reynolds, 68 N.W. 217 (Mich. 1896), recognized that Michigan case law had noted a distinction. 
The cases indicated that the general public might have a broader common law right of access than private 
individuals. See id. at 217. Finding it unnecessary to explore that broader right, the court held that an 
individual had no absolute common law right of access to court records for personal gain. In re Caswell 
29 A. 259 (R.I. 1893), held that a newspaper's common law right of access to court records depends on the 
newspaper having proper purposes. The court recognized that an individual must have an interest in the 
records, but noted that the interest need not necessarily be private; the individual may act as a 
representative of a broader common or public right 
For a survey of state court decisions regarding the permissibility of public access to judicial records, 
see Anno., "Public Access to State Court Records," 84 A.L.R.3d 598, 626 §§ 10(b), (d) (1978). In addition 
to the cases in the sections cited by the State, the annotation cites numerous cases recognizing broader 
access rights. These other holdings include an apparently unqualified view that the public has free access 
to public records; that the right to access need not depend on a showing of a particular interest; and that 
access may be permissible before commencement of trial See id. at 616-27. Most importantly, the 
annotation points out that the narrow view advocated by the State is not necessarily conflicting with, nor 
even mutually exclusive from, the broader views, several of which were enunciated by the same courts. See 
id. at 626 n.2. 
In short, the public's right of access to public 
records is not dependent on an interest in the records for 
litigation purposes. Cases that have repeated this narrow view 
have done so without examining the purported rule, often in 
dictum, or have applied an earlier English procedural version. 
Courts in this country have consistently distinguished this 
narrow view from the general rule that the public has a 
presumptive common law right of access to public records. 
Finally, the State argues that ••[a]lthough actual 
practice with regard to public access to some judicial documents 
may have altered over the years in other American states or as a 
matter of federal common law applicable to documents filed in 
federal courts, neither is determinative of the common law issue 
in Utah." (Resp. Br. at 39-40.) The State contends that there 
is no reason for this Court to adopt any part of the common law 
rule that has developed in federal or state courts since the time 
of Utah statehood. (Resp. Br. at 48-49.) Again, the State 
misunderstands the common law right and its application in Utah. 
The Utah Code provides: 
The common law of England so far as it is not 
repugnant to, or in conflict with, the 
constitution or laws of the United States, or 
the constitution or laws of this state, and so 
far only as it is consistent with and adapted 
to the natural and physical conditions of this 
state and the necessities of the people 
hereof, is hereby adopted, and shall be the 
rule of decision in all courts of this state. 
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-1 (1953). The statute's plain language, 
along with this Court's clear guidance on its meaning, foreclose 
giving credence to the State's argument. 
In Cahoon v. Pelton, 9 Utah 2d 224f 342 P.2d 94 (1959), 
this Court held that when determining the common law rule to 
apply in a given case, "we look to the system of common law and 
equity which prevails in and has been and is now being developed 
by the decisions of this country and we reject the common law of 
England which is not suitable or adapted to our needs, morals or 
ideals." 
The rule advanced by the State fails to meet this 
standard in two ways. First, it is not the law which "prevails 
in and has and is now being developed by the decisions of this 
country"; and second, it is not "suitable or adapted to our 
needs, morals or ideals." 
The broad right of public access to public records pre-
dates Utah's statehood and continues its development to this day. 
In 1879, Ferry v. Williams, 41 N.J. L. 332 (Sup. Ct. 1879), 
reviewed the precedents at length. Two principles emerged from 
that review. "First, the existence of a suit was not a sine qua 
non for the exercise of the right of inspection. Second, 
inspection was justified in favor of a private party for a public 
right if the private party could sue to protect the public 
right." C. v. C., 320 A.2d 717, 723 (Del. 1974) (quoting and 
discussing Ferry). Other pre-statehood cases concurred. E.g., 
Ex parte Drawbauoh, 2 App.D.C. 404, 407-08 (1894); Clay v. 
Ballard, 87 Va. 787, 790 (1891); Burton v. Tuite, 44 N.W. 282, 
285 (Mich. 1889); State ex rel. Conran v. Williams, 96 Mo. 13, 19 
(1888); Brewer v. Watson, 71 Ala. 299, 304 (1882). 
Modern cases have also concurred. "X[A]11 authorities 
are agreed that at common law a person may inspect public records 
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. . . or make copies or memoranda thereof.'" People ex rel. 
Gibson v. Peller, 181 N.E.2d 376, 378 (111. App. 1962) (quoting 
76 C.J.S. Records § 35, at 133). Thus the original common law, 
as well as that which has continued to develop, embodies a 
broader right in the public in general. 
Additionally, the narrow view advanced by the State is 
not suitable or adaptable to the ideals and needs of the people 
of Utah, as citizens of the state and of the United States. 
Indeed, the State of Utah's most recent expression of the general 
public policy regarding access to government records, the 
Government Records Access and Management Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-2-101 (1992) ("GRAMA"), expresses the right of the public to 
access such documents in constitutional terms. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-2-102(1)(a) (1992). Clearly, then, the common law right of 
access at issue here is not the narrow view recognized by the 
English courts and largely rejected in the United States. It is 
that right expounded by the Nixon court and other courts 
regularly today. In recognizing the common law right of access, 
this Court should look to the common law in its maturity. 
2. The common law right of access to pretrial 
documents has not been superseded in Utah by 
legislation. 
The State also argues that any common law right of 
public access to pretrial documents has been superseded in Utah 
by legislation that comprehensively regulates the area of public 
access. However, 
[t]he rule of the common law that statutes in 
derogation thereof are to be strictly 
construed has no application to the statutes 
of this state. The statutes establish the 
laws of this state respecting the subjects to 
which they relate, and their provisions and 
all proceedings under them are to be liberally 
construed with a vie# to effect the objects of 
the statutes and to promote justice. 
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-2 (1953). This section is mandatory, and 
is required to be given full effect upon a question of first 
impression. See Hammond v. Wall, 51 Utah 464, 171 P. 148 (1918); 
Houston Real Estate Inv. Co. v. Hechler, 44 Utah 64, 138 P. 1159 
(1914). 
The intent of the Utah Legislature in enacting the 
statutory access provisions in force when this case arose is 
clear from the language of the statutes. The Public and Private 
Writings Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-26-2 (repealed effective 
April 1, 1992), stated that H[e]very citizen has a right to 
inspect and take copy of any public writing of this state except 
as otherwise expressly provided by statute." The Archives and 
Records Services and Information Practices Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-2-66 (repealed effective April 2, 1992), stated that the 
state archivist is to keep the public records and "to make them 
accessible, unless otherwise restricted by law, for convenient 
use and shall permit them to be inspected, examined, abstracted, 
or copied at reasonable times under his supervision by any 
person." 
The language of these statutes (and the newly enacted 
GRAMA) does not repeal the widely recognized common law right of 
access discussed above. Rather, these statutes pronounce public 
policy; they reaffirm the common law.6 The legislature, out of 
abundant caution and with an unmistakable object in view, enacted 
statutes to ensure that persons having an interest in public 
records would have a right to inspect them. The enactment of 
statutes that are in harmony with the public policy developed at 
common law does not require this Court to disregard two centuries 
of helpful analysis provided by the common law. The common law 
right of access may co-exist with the statutory right. By 
explicitly recognizing a common law right of access, this Court 
makes available scores of volumes of commentary and reasoned 
policy to guide courts in properly deciding access questions. 
The statutes then may mandate the rule and detail the procedure; 
case law specifically addresses particular situations.7 
The cases cited by the State are not to the contrary. 
In Nixon, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court considered a claim of 
common law right of access in light of the Presidential 
Recordings Act, a statute enacted specifically to deal with the 
tapes at issue. The Court recognized the common law right, as 
did both parties. The Court then balanced the interests 
involved, concluding that the existence of an act passed to 
6
 In People ex rel. Gibson v. Peller. 181 N.R2d 376 (111. App. 1962), the court considered the right 
of access to public records under common law and statutory theories. The statute involved read: "Any 
person shall have the right of access to any public records of the expenditure or receipt of public funds . . . 
for the purpose of obtaining copies of the same or of making photographs of the same " 111. Rev. 
Stat. U 43.7 (West 1988). The court found that this statute did not repeal the common law right Rather, 
it "declares the public policy relating to public records in the State of Illinois." 181 N.E.2d at 378. 
7
 GRAMA, for example, provides that arrest warrants after issuance and search warrants after 
execution and filing are public documents that must be disclosed except upon a showing of "good cause." 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-301(2)(m&n) (1992). A myriad of cases, many of which have been cited in the 
context of this appeal, have considered the issues at stake and could be brought to bear in the 
interpretation of "good cause" under GRAMA In general, although common law principles in direct 
conflict with GRAMA must yield to the statute, when cases arise that are not covered by GRAMA, the 
common law would control. 
address the specific tapes at issue weighed the scales in favor 
of denying access. The Court did not hold, as the State 
purports, that the Act modified the common law right of access. 
In Bend Publishing Co. v. Haner, 244 P. 868 (Ore. 
1926), a newspaper sought access to court records under a state 
statute. The court did not consider a common law claim to 
access. The court did note that statutes in force enlarged the 
common law right enunciated by the court to allow access by all 
persons for any lawful purpose. Similarly, in Mulford v. Davev, 
186 P.2d 360 (Nev. 1947), the court determined that a common law 
right of access was enlarged by statute, allowing the general 
public access at all times during office hours. 
This Court should find that the Press has a common law 
right of access to documents reviewed in conjunction with 
preliminary hearings, independent of existing statutes. 
II. 
THE PRESS HAS A RIGHT OF ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS 
ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE IN AN OPEN PRELIMINARY HEARING 
A. The Press Has Preserved Its Claim Of Access To Documents 
Admitted Into Evidence In An Open Preliminary Hearing. 
The State contends that the Press has failed to 
preserve for appeal any claim of a constitutional or common law 
right to inspect and copy documents admitted into evidence during 
an open preliminary hearing. The State contends that the issue 
of access to evidence was raised for the first time at the 
January 19, 1990 hearing on objections to proposed findings and 
conclusions and that previously no argument had been presented 
concerning access to evidence. (Resp. Br. at 10-12, 42-44.) 
These contentions are simply erroneous. 
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That the parties and the court below were cognizant of 
the separate issue of access to documents received in evidence at 
the preliminary hearing is clear from the memoranda filed in 
connection with the proceedings below as well as the transcripts 
of those proceedings. At the September 7, 1989 hearing, for 
example, the district court asked counsel for the defendants and 
for the State to delineate the specific items of evidence 
received at the preliminary hearing that they believed should 
remain sealed. (Transcript of Hearing, September 7, 1989, at 6.) 
Mr. Peterson, counsel for the State below, and Mr. Taylor, 
counsel for defendant Wood, each expressed comments reflecting 
counsel's understanding that the exhibits received at the 
preliminary hearing were also before the court. (Transcript of 
Hearing, September 7, 1989, at 6:22, 11:9-13, 13:11-18, 18:5-25, 
19:1-5, 19:21-25, 20:1-4.) Indeed, counsel for the Press 
specified their understanding as to whether the issue of access 
to evidence was under consideration: "[W]e are asking ... to 
view those items of evidence that were before a court at some 
time in the process of making a decision." (Transcript of 
Hearing, September 7, 1989, at 19:9-14.) 
At the hearing on September 11, 1989, counsel for all 
parties again expressed their understanding that the documents 
received in evidence at the preliminary hearing were under 
consideration by the court. Ms. Geary, counsel for the State 
below, said: "The way I understood it was that there were two 
issues, the preliminary hearing transcript and the release of 
that, and all of the documents that became part of that 
preliminary hearing transcript." Seeking clarification on 
IP 
Ms. Geary's statement, the court inquired: "If anything was 
offered in evidence as an exhibit, it became part of the 
preliminary hearing and is sealed." Ms. Geary responded: 
"Right." (Transcript of Hearing, September 11, 1989, at 10:5-
12.) In fact, Ms. Geary requested that the State's argument 
regarding the "preliminary hearing transcript and accompanying 
exhibits" be held in chambers. (Transcript of Hearing, 
September 11, 1989, at 12:11-15.) Finally at this hearing, 
counsel for the State and the defendants again delineated for the 
court those items of evidence received at the preliminary hearing 
which they believed warranted being held under seal, including 
the pathologist report, the autopsy report, photographs, and 
statements of the defendants. (Transcript of Hearing, 
September 11, 1989, at 19:10, 34:20-25, 35:1-3, 35:13-25, 36:1-3, 
38:6-12, 40:14-25, 41:7-16.) 
Following the September hearings, the State submitted a 
Supplemental Statement in Response to Motion to Unseal Court 
File. In its opening paragraph, the State noted that the 
district court had just concluded an evidentiary hearing wherein 
it "received evidence, heard testimony and oral argument on the 
issue of access to the preliminary hearing transcript and 
exhibits received as evidence at that hearing." (R. 633.) 
On October 23, 1989, the district court issued its 
Order on these matters. At that time, the court ordered that the 
seal placed on the transcript of the preliminary hearing be 
dissolved, but that the seal be continued as to "tangible items 
of evidence including pictorial or diagrammatic exhibits received 
in evidence at the preliminary hearing." (R. 943-44; Appellants' 
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Br. App. 1.) Thereafter, the parties submitted proposed Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law. In the opening paragraph of the 
State's proposed findings and conclusions, the State phrased the 
issue considered by the court as "whether the presumption of 
openness to the preliminary hearing transcript and documents 
received at that hearing in these cases was outweighed or in any 
way modified by the interests of the State and/or the 
defendants." (R. 1100) On behalf of the Press, counsel 
submitted proposed findings and conclusions along with a cover 
letter which specifically addressed the court's decision with 
respect to the exhibits received in evidence at the preliminary 
hearing. (R. 1685-86.) As later explained at the January 19, 
1990 hearing on the proposed findings and conclusion, the purpose 
of this letter was to help flush out the court's decision with 
respect to the exhibits received in evidence at the preliminary 
hearing. (Transcript of Hearing, January 19, 1990, at 38.) At 
the January 19 hearing itself, each of the parties devoted time 
to a discussion of this issue. The State continued to advance 
its position that the Press does not have a right of access to 
documents received in evidence at preliminary hearings, 
(Transcript of Hearing, January 19, 1990, at 26:8-16, 28:6-19, 
51:3-23), and the Press continued to object to this conclusion. 
(Transcript of Hearing, January 19, 1990, at 38:11 to 43:13.) 
The portion of the January 19 hearing on which the 
State basis its argument that the issue of access to evidence was 
waived involves a lengthy exchange between Patrick A. Shea, 
counsel for the Press below, and the court. This colloquia 
started with a discussion of two concepts — the issue of access 
to evidence admitted in preliminary hearings and the question of 
the proper interpretation of the Information Practices Act. 
(Transcript of Hearing, January 19, 1990, at 57-58.) As part of 
this general exchange, counsel and the court began discussing a 
third issue — whether the media is entitled to the same access 
in the courtroom as are counsel, e.g., access behind the bar in 
counsel area. (Transcript of Hearing, January 19, 1990, at 61-
63.) It was as to this third issue of physical access of the 
media to the courtroom that the court expressed concern that the 
issue was not before it. After the court expressed its concern 
on this third issue, Mr. Shea returned to the previous question 
relating to the release of the transcript of the preliminary 
hearing but not the evidence admitted in connection with that 
hearing. (Transcript of Hearing, January 19, 1990, at 63:22-25.) 
The court then clarified its understanding that the issue of 
access to evidence received in connection with open preliminary 
hearings had been preserved for appeal. The court said: 
I think the issue is there. I really think 
the issue is there, the way the ruling has 
been framed. I don't think you have any — 
I don't think there would be any problem in 
raising that issue on appeal. I really don't, 
because I've clearly said what I think you're 
entitled to at that point, and what I think 
the court documents provision of our law 
coverfs], and they would be those exhibits, 
those pictorial, things that are not 
represented totally by just mere rules of 
description, which you're entitled to. 
(Transcript of Hearing, January 19, 1990, at 64:4-15.) 
In short, the record is replete with references to the 
issue of access to evidence admitted at the preliminary hearing. 
This issue has been preserved for appeal and is properly before 
this Court. 
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B. The Press Has A Constitutional Right Of Access To 
Documents Admitted Into Evidence In An Open Preliminary 
Hearing. 
The State admits that the "cases cited by the media 
[are] persuasive on a narrowly framed issue involving ... access 
to specific evidentiary items introduced at the preliminary 
hearing in this case." (Resp. Br. at 45.) Indeed, the State 
concedes that "'[a]ccess' by the public to the information 
contained in [interviews admitted into evidence at the 
preliminary hearing here] may be protected by the first amendment 
as part of its constitutional right to attend a preliminary 
hearing." (Resp. Br. at 46 n.20.) It goes on to argue, however, 
that the Press has no constitutional right to "inspect and copy 
any exhibit received into evidence at any presumptively open 
court proceeding ... at any stage of the judicial process." 
(Resp. Br. at 44.) 
As previously noted above, the Press does not, by this 
appeal, seek an advisory opinion as to all documents of any kind 
received into evidence at any proceeding. Rather, the Press 
seeks review of the issue presented by the facts and 
circumstances of this case: whether there is a constitutional 
right8 of access to inspect and copy exhibits received into 
evidence at an open preliminary hearing. The cases cited by the 
8
 As noted in our opening brief at 25-27, Article I, section 15 of the Utah Constitution contains 
language significantly different from and substantially broader than the language appearing in the First 
Amendment to the federal constitution. The inclusion of the words "abridge or restrain" rather than 
merely "abridge" signals an intent that the Utah provision provide protection at least as great as that given 
under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. See KUTV v. Conder. 668 P.2d 513 (Utah 
1983). Moreover, Article 1, section 11 of the Utah Constitution contains an expansive open courts 
provision, recognizing that "[a]ll courts shall be open." These sections of the Utah Constitution support a 
finding of rights at least as broad as the rights recognized under the United States Constitution on the 
question of access to exhibits received in evidence during open preliminary hearings. 
State have no bearing on this issue. Instead, the State cites 
cases dealing with the somewhat unique question of whether the 
Press has a constitutional right to copy tapes received in 
evidence. Of the cases cited by the State, several involve the 
limited situation where the press sought to make copies of tapes 
for rebroadcast and sale to the public even though the press had 
already been provided a complete transcript of the tapes. E.g., 
Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 594 (1978) 
(discussed in Appellant's Brief at 35 n.39); Belo Broadcasting 
Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423, 427 (5th Cir. 1981); United States 
v. Webbe, 791 F.2d 103, 105 (8th Cir. 1986). In those cases, the 
courts held the press had no special right to make aural copies 
where they had received a copy of the information presented at 
the open proceeding.9 No such issue is presented here. 
The State argues that a constitutional right of 
access to exhibits should not be recognized because of the 
administrative burden that would result from such a ruling. 
The State contends that concerns over maintaining the physical 
integrity of original documents and nondocumentary exhibits 
requires that access be denied. As previously noted in our 
opening brief, the Press acknowledges that any inspection and 
copying of exhibits must be done without impairing the integrity 
of the evidence or interfering with the orderly conduct of the 
9
 Interestingly, the cases cited by the State for the proposition that there is no constitutional right 
to copy tapes received in evidence each went on to hold there is a common law right to copy tapes 
received in evidence, Rgy Nixon, 435 U.S. at 608; United States v. Beckham. 789 F.2d 401, 412 (6th Or. 
1986); Belo, 654 R2d at 429; Webbe. 791 F.2d at 106; State ex rel. KOIN-TV, 711 P.2d 966, 974 (Ore. 
1985); Valley Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark. 798 F.2d 1289,1293 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Thomas, 
745 F.Supp. 499,502 (M.D. Tenn. 1990); United States v. Criden. 648 F.2d 814,823 (3d Cir. 1981). 
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trial• The specific methods by which this can be accomplished 
should be left to the discretion of the court given the 
particular circumstances of the documents and other exhibits, and 
the nature of the request. 
The State also argues that access to evidence admitted 
at preliminary hearings should be denied because evidence might 
be admitted which may not be legally admissible at trial. This 
issue was fully considered, and rejected, by this Court in 
connection with its review of access to the preliminary hearing 
itself. Kearns-Tribune v. Lewis, 685 P.2d 515, 526-27 (Utah 
1984). Any concerns regarding potential jurors being tainted by 
exposure to evidence which may be inadmissible at trial is 
properly accommodated through the exercise of available 
alternatives. This is true whether the evidence to which the 
jurors are exposed is received in documentary form or by witness 
testimony. 
The State's concerns are easily accommodated through 
the tests already subscribed to by this Court. Documents 
admitted into evidence at a presumptively open preliminary 
hearing should also be subject to the presumption of openness. 
C. The Press Has A Common Law Right Of Access To Documents 
Admitted Into Evidence In An Open Preliminary Hearing. 
The State makes the same arguments regarding a common 
law right of access to documents admitted into evidence in open 
preliminary hearings as it did with regard to documents filed in 
conjunction with those hearings. Specifically, the State argues 
that the Court should not look to the "federal" common law to 
resolve questions of access in Utah but, rather, should be 
required to apply the common law that existed in the State of 
Utah at the time of statehood• The State also contends that the 
common law has been obviated as a source of any access right in 
Utah by virtue of statutes promulgated on the same issue. 
The Press fully responded to each of these arguments in 
Point 1(C), above, and, by this reference, incorporates its 
response as if fully set forth herein. 
CONCLUSION 
When the issue before the Court is properly framed, the 
appropriate result is clear: There is no principled reason to 
distinguish between access to preliminary hearings and access to 
the documents which guide the decisionmaker in connection with 
those hearings, whether those documents are found in the court 
files or received in evidence during the hearing itself. The 
public is and should be interested in the information that 
informs the courts of this State in making decisions affecting 
the life and liberty of its citizens. If the public is 
adequately to scrutinize and learn from the criminal process, it 
cannot be denied access to documents that play an integral role 
in forming the basis of the decisions made and the issues 
discussed during that process. It is this type of access and 
involvement in the process that this Court has recognized as 
important in preserving our republican system. The public's 
right of access should be extended to documents filed with and/or 
reviewed by a court in connection with a preliminary hearing and 
evidence received during the course of a preliminary hearing. 
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